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You've got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em,
Know when to walk away, know when to run.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is not an easy age in which to serve as a state court judge. In state
courts we find increasing pressure on judicial selection, in part driven by the
"increase in politicized judicial campaigns." 2 In turn, the trend toward the
increasing politicization of judicial selection places increasing pressure on
judicial independence.3 Consider, for example, the recent ousting of all three
Iowa Supreme Court justices up for retention votes this past year.4 Their sole sin

*

John T. Campbell Professor of Business and Ethics Emeritus, and Distinguished

Professor Emeritus, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.B.A., 1967, J.D., 1970,

University of Notre Dame; LL.M. 1976, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Ohio and South

Carolina Bars. The author serves as a member of South Carolina's Judicial Merit Selection
Commission. He participated in the screening of Judge F.P. ("Charlie") Segars-Andrews. He was a
member of a 7-3 minority of Commissioners who found Judge Segars-Andrews ethically fit to
continue serving as a family court judge.
L KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler,on THE GAMBLER (United Artists 1978).
2. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
15, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22) [hereinafter Conference
of Chief Justices BriefJ.
3. See id. at 4.
4. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster oflowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2010, at Al.
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was that they had joined in their court's unanimous 7-0 decision legalizing same
sex marriage, 5 thereby bringing their retention elections within the cross-hairs of
aggressive and well-heeled special interest groups.
As the Iowa experience shows, a judge today need do nothing wrong in
order to risk coming under a career-ending attack. Given this reality, actually
committing a serious error-particularly one smacking of ethical improprietywould be extremely ill-advised. Thankfully, many forms of ethical impropriety
for state court judges are marked by explicit signposts. For example, judges are
expressly barred from engaging in certain ex parte communications, serving
voluntarily as character witnesses, 8 belonging to discriminatory clubs,9 hearing
cases in which close family members are lawyers or parties,10 and so forth.
However, not all judicial ethics pathways are clearly marked. This Article
focuses on the most amorphous command in all ofjudicial ethics-the obligation

5. See Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (2009); Sulzberg, supra note 4, at Al.
6. See Sulzberger, supra note 4, at Al. The frontal attack on judicial independence was
unapologetic and vehement:
The outcome of the election was heralded . . . as a national demonstration that
conservatives who have long complained about "legislators in robes" are able to
effectively target and remove judges who issue unpopular decisions.
Leaders of the recall campaign said the results should be a warning to judges
elsewhere.
"I think it will send a message across the country that the power resides with the
people," said Bob Vander Plaats, an unsuccessful Republican candidate for governor who
led the campaign. "It's we the people, not we the courts."
Conservative groups this year launched similar campaigns in a number of the 16
states that use merit selection, targeting supreme court justices for rulings on abortion,
taxes, tort reform and health care.
The ouster [of the Iowa judges] was reminiscent of a retention election in California
in 1986 that led to the removal of three Supreme Court justices who were portrayed as
opposing the death penalty.
"Obviously it has an impact on the independence of judges and how they think of
their role-I think that's demonstrable," said Joseph R. Grodin, a law professor who was
one of the three California judges who lost a re-election bid. "But more than that," he
continued, "I think the damage is not on judges, but that courts will come to be seen and
judges will come to be seen as simply legislators with robes."
Id
7. S.C. APP. Cr. R. 501 Canon 3B(7).
8. Id. at Canon 2B cmt. ("A judge must not testify voluntarily as a character witness
because to do so may lend the prestige of the judicial office in support of the party for whom the
judge testifies.").
9. Id at Canon 2C ("A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices
invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.").
10. Id. at Canon 3E(l)(d)(i)-(ii) ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding
in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where . . . the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party; [or] (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding . . . .").
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of judges to avoid engaging in conduct presenting "the appearance of
impropriety.""
A recent article in the South Carolina Lawyer asked, "What are the three
most important ethical issues that lawyers face?" 2 The author answered,
"Conflicts, conflicts, conflicts."13 I agree and would argue that the same is true
for judges. Conflicts arising from the push or pull of money, friendship, loyalty,
or self-interest all have the potential for creating an appearance of impropriety,
thereby placing a shadow of doubt over a judge's fairness and impartiality.
To help judges and litigants make the adjustments needed to ensure that
proceedings are conducted impartially in appearance and in fact, a safety valve
exists in the form of judicial recusal, or its more self-explanatory counterpartdisqualification.14 The recusal process is available both to judges and to litigants
concerned with bias, prejudice, or conflicts problems, or their appearance. By
providing a mechanism for flushing impurity out of the judicial bloodstream,
recusal has thus come to be recognized as "perhaps the States' most reliable
weapon for maintaining both the reality and the appearance of a 'fair hearing in a
fair tribunal' for every litigant."' 5
This Article examines decisionmaking in judicial recusal cases based on the
appearance of impropriety standard. It looks at those recusal situations from two
perspectives. First, the Article explores the implications of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., a case7
illustrating that a judge's failure to recuse can have due process ramifications.
As we shall see, Caperton also calls into question the legal test used by South
Carolina's appellate courts in evaluating a claim that a judge hearing a matter in
a court below improperly refused to step aside in the face of a recusal motion.
Second, this Article considers lessons that can be learned about recusal
decisions from the South Carolina Judicial Merit Selection Commission's muchdiscussed ruling in 2009 concerning the qualifications of Family Court Judge
F.P. ("Charlie") Segars-Andrews.'s By a 7-3 vote taken after two separate

11. Id. at Canon 2.
12. Nathan M. Crystal, Conflict Waivers [sic? -A Primer, S.C. LAW., Mar. 2009, at 10, 10.
13. Id.
14. The words "recusal" and "disqualification" are effectively synonymous and are often
used interchangeably, though this Article sticks with the word "recusal" to avoid confusion.
"Whereas 'recusal' normally refers to a judge's decision to stand down voluntarily,
'disqualification' has typically been reserved for situations involving the statutorily or
constitutionally mandated removal of a judge upon the request of a moving party or its counsel."
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

§ 1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 2007) (footnote omitted).
15. Conference of Chief Justices Brief, supra note 2, at 16.
16. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
17. See id. at 2256-57.
COMM'N, REPORT OF
A CANDIDATE'S
MERIT
SELECTION
18. See JUDICIAL
QUALIFICATIONS: THE HONORABLE F.P. "CHARGtE" SEGARS-ANDREWS, FAMILY COURT, NINTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SEAT 1, at 12 (S.C. 2009) [hereinafter MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT],

available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/FinalSegarsAndrewsCharlie.pdf.
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hearings, the Commission concluded that Judge Segars-Andrews was ethically
unfit to continue serving as a judge based on a family court litigant's complaint
regarding her failure to recuse herself on appearance of impropriety grounds in a
divorce case. 20
We begin our discussion with a brief overview of the meaning of appearance
of impropriety as it is used in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY?
The appearance of impropriety standard appears in two places in both the
prior and present version of the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.21 The present version of the Code, finalized in 2007, offers
the following description of what is meant by conduct giving rise to an
appearance of impropriety: "The test for appearance of impropriety is whether
the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge
violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the
judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge." 22 The
Code's reasonableness test envisions an observer of the judge's situation who is
well versed in the facts-"The reasonable person employed by the judicial ethics
community also possesses all the facts. This ubiquitous observer of judicial
conduct is variously described as 'fully informed,' 'knowing all the
circumstances,' 'know[ing] and understand[ing] all the relevant facts,' and aware
of the 'totality of circumstances."' 23

19. See id. at 5. The complaint filed by Mr. William R. Simpson, Jr. in affidavit form
appears as Exhibit 1 to the public hearing held by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission
concerning the qualifications of Judge Segars-Andrews. See Public Hearing on Judicial
Qualificationsfor Judge Segars-Andrews Before the JudicialMerit Selection Commission, Exhibit
1, at 1-5 (S.C. Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Public Hearing Exhibit 1], available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpagefTranscriptlnfol20209/091202fsaEx0l.pdf.
20. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
21. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) (requiring that a judge "avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities"); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1990) (imposing a duty upon a judge to "disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned"). The
ABA's 2007 version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct incorporates the appearance of
impropriety standard formerly found in Canon 2 into new Canon 1, see MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007). The "might reasonably be questioned" standard for disqualification
formerly found in Canon 3E(1) now appears in new Rule 2.11, see MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT at R. 2.11 (2007).
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2007). The test in the 1990 Code
was slightly different. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (1990) ("The test
for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception
that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and
competence is impaired.").
23. Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disciplineand the Appearance of Impropriety: What the
Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1944-45 (2010) (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting multiple sources describing the hypothetical reasonable observer).
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Under the appearance of impropriety test, it is well-established and
understood that proof of actual misconduct is not required.24 Of course, this
means that a judge can face punishment for an appearance of impropriety
violation without actually engaging in an expressly prohibited act in violation of
the Code.2 5 In other words, a judge can render a decision free from any actual
bias and still be punished if, under the facts, the appearance of bias was present.
Lawyers are more fortunate. Under their parallel set of ethical standards
found in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers need to actually

commit a wrong in order to be punished for unethical behavior; the appearance
standard is not in play, though it once was. 26 The rationale for rejecting the
appearance of impropriety prohibition in lawyer ethics cases was the vagueness
of the appearance standard;2 7 the rationale for keeping the admittedly vague
appearance standard for judicial conduct is that "judges represent the system as a
whole and must be both right-acting and right-appearing.
This formulation of
judges' professional obligations exposes the daunting reality that can cause a
judge to lose more than his or her sleep-conduct by a "right-acting" judge may
nonetheless be "wrong-appearing" and hence unethical. When it comes to
ethical behavior, being at all times "both right-acting and right-appearing" may
be a challenging assignment for judges, but falling short in either respect can be
a reputation or career-threatening event, as the following discussion focusing on
the Caperton and Segars-Andrews matters illustrates.
III. CAPERTON AND THE IMPACT OF MONEY

A commonly repeated saying is that "money is the root of all evil." The
phrase is factually inaccurate (it overlooks other corrupting forces such as selfinterest, kinship, and misplaced loyalty, for example), and it may not even be an
accurate translation from its Greek heritage.29 Even so, money's utility when it
comes to influencing human behavior is sufficiently well-established as to be
eligible for judicial notice.

24. See id.at 1918.

25. See id.
26. Canon 9 of the ABA's Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibilitywas formally titled, "A
Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBLITY Canon 9 (1980). When the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
superseded the Code, the appearance requirement was dropped. See Roberta K. Flowers, What You
See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standardto Prosecutors,63 MO. L.
REv. 699, 717 (1998).
27. See Flowers, supra note 26, at 766.
28. Id.
29. The phrase derives from a saying attributed to Jesus in the Apostle Paul'sFirst Epistle to
Timothy in the New Testament-"For the love of money is the root of all evil." I Timothy 6:10
(King James). A more accurate reading from the original Greek may be, "For the love of money is
a root of all sorts of evil." I Timothy 6:10 (New American Standard).
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The Supreme Court's holding in Caperton v. A. T. Masse7 Coal Co.30 most
recently spotlighted the power of cash as a corrupting force. In Caperton, the
Court held that a justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was
disqualified on due process grounds from sitting on a case involving a campaign
contributor.32 The contributor's company, A.T. Massey Coal Co., had a motive
for wanting to purchase judicial favor because it faced a $50 million judgment
on appeal from a jury verdict.33
While the appeal was pending, the company's chief executive, Don
Blankenship, spent $3 million on personal campaign contributions to support
Brent Benjamin as a candidate for election to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia. In both absolute and relative terms, Blankenship's contribution
to Benjamin's campaign effort was very large: "Blankenship's $3 million in
contributions were more than the total amount spent by all other Benjamin
supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee."35
36
Benjamin won the election by a narrow margin, and when the case arrived on
appeal he was greeted with a recusal motion filed by Massey's adversary,
Caperton.37 Justice Benjamin rejected the recusal motion, and then voted in
favor of Massey when the case was heard, tipping the balance in Massey's favor
by a 3-2 margin.38 Thereafter, Caperton sought certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, attacking Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself on due
process grounds. 39
In one of the many amicus briefs submitted in support of petitioners, the
amici curiae argued, "Justice Benjamin's decision not to recuse himself from
Massey's appeal-despite the staggering amount of Blankenship's campaign
expenditures and the timing of those contributions in relation to Massey's
appeal-creates an undeniable appearance of impropriety, if not evidence of an
actual bias." 4 0 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that "there are
objective standards that require recusal when 'the probability of actual bias on
the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable."' 41 Applying those standards, the Court held that, under the
circumstances of the case, due process required recusal.42 The objective

30. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
31. See id. at 2257, 2264-65.
32. Id. at 2256-57.
33. See id. at 2257-58.
34. Id. at 2257.
35. Id.
36. See id Benjamin "received 382,036 votes (53.3%), and [his opponent] McGraw received
334,301 votes (46.7%)." Id.
37. See id
38. See idat 2257-58.
39. See id. at 2259.
40. Brief of Justice At Stake et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17, Caperton
129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22). Twenty-eight groups joined in the brief Id. app. at 1.
41. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
42. Id.
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standards cited by Justice Kennedy in Caperton provide guidance for evaluating
recusal arguments, particularly in cases where the judge has received a
substantial benefit.
First, the Court held that a due process violation can be premised on
evidence that falls short of "proof of actual bias."43 Instead, all that is needed is
evidence showing "a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and
reasonable perceptions." 4 4 In other words, proof of a high "probability" 45 or
"serious risk of actual bias"46 on a judge's part not only justifies recusal, but also
provides grounds for an appellate challenge to a refusal to recuse under the Due
Process Clause.47
In lieu of an inquiry into the existence of actual bias, Caperton instructs
reviewing courts to determine "whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented."'48 Recusal is required, we are
told, whenever "an objective inquiry into [the conflict problem] under all the
circumstances 'would offer a possible temptation to the average .. .judge to ...
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."' 49
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Caperton imported its admonition that judges
are to "hold the balance nice, clear and true" from the Court's 1927 ruling in
Tumey v. Ohio.s0

Like Caperton, Tumey involved money as the conflicting

ingredient.si In Tumey, the judicial officer-who was also the town's mayorreceived a share of court costs as a salary supplement, provided that criminal
defendants were convicted; the judge received nothing upon acquittals.52 The
conviction bonus in Tumey was not large; the judge received a sum of $12 when
defendants were convicted. 53 That relatively small sum tipping one side of the
scales of justice was sufficient to invoke due process concerns. The Court
explained:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration
as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the
requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied
by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest selfsacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 2263.
Id.
Id. at 2259 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2263.
See id. at 2263-65.
Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
Id at 2264 (omissions in original) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531-32.
See id. at 520.
Id at 531-32.
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which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.54
The Supreme Court's due process ruling in Tumey was unanimous.5 Though
Caperton involved more mone than Tumey by a factor of 250,000, the Caperton
voting margin was razor-thin. The Court in Caperton split 5-4, which means
that four sitting Supreme Court Justices concluded that the payment of the
extraordinary sum of $3 million on behalf of a party to a lawsuit to elect a
favored judge-who then proceeded to cast a crucial vote in the party's favor in
a $50 million case-did not give rise to an appearance of impropriety
sufficiently serious to deprive the opposing party of due process. 57
Tumey illustrates that a due process argument leveled at a sitting judge
resonates strongly in a self-dealing situation-that is, when the judge is subject
to temptation because of a personal financial interest in the matter's outcome.58
A judge's disqualifying payoff need not be immediate or direct in order to raise
due process concerns. Thus, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie," the Court

held that an Alabama Supreme Court justice was required to recuse himself from
a case alleging bad faith against an insurance company where the case had the
potential for creating precedent favorable to the justice in a separate bad faith
case that he was personally prosecuting.60
Caperton illustrates that the size, timing, and targeting of judicial
contributions are factors to be weighed when evaluating the consequences of a
judge's financial entanglements in handling a case. The majority in Caperton

54. Id. at 532.
55. See id. at 514. It may be noted that the earlier ruling by the Ohio Court of Appeals
upholding the one-sided payment system was also unanimous, for dismissal. See State v. Tumey, 4
Ohio Law Abs. 109, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925) (holding that the court lacked power to interfere with
a state statute defining the judge-mayor's jurisdiction).
56. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. CL 2252, 2256 (2009).
57. See id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977) (per curiam) (applying
Tumey and holding that the defendant's due process rights were violated when a justice of the peace
was compensated for issuance of search warrants).
59. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
60. See id at 816-19, 821-25; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973)
(finding that due process rights of litigants were violated when a disciplinary tribunal was composed
of competitors); Rissler v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 693 S.E.2d 321, 329 (2010) (per
curiam) (holding that a zoning board member was barred from participating in a vote on a project
where a member's company would receive work if the project was approved for development).
61. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264. The same Justices who decided Caperton denied
certiorari in Dupre v. TeIxon Corp., 129 S. Ct. 200 (2008). Dupre was an Ohio case where a
corporate executive whose company was involved in litigation had allegedly contributed $15,000"nearly one third of the total funds raised"-to a judge's earlier House campaign, plus additional
sums exceeding $500,000 to the Republican Party of Summit County, some of which may have
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expressly validated Caperton's contention that a litigant is deprived of due
process when the other side provides support for the judge sufficient to raise the
likelihood that the judge would "feel a debt of gratitude" to that party.62
A similar "debt of gratitude" case is Piercev. Pierce.6 3 There, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held that recusal was required on due process grounds where
opposing counsel and his father both contributed the maximum amount allowed
in furtherance of a judge's campaign while the case was pending and prior to
trial; also while the case was pending, osposing counsel personally solicited
additional funds for the judge's campaign. The court held that the risk of taint
was so great that it could not apply a harmless error standard, thus necessitating
reversal of the lower court's decree.s On the other hand, recusal has been held
not to be required in cases involving a contribution of less than one percent of
funds raised for a judge's campaign and the donation of lavish contributions to
a judge's political party by a corporate executive whose company was involved
in major litigation.
Caperton provides a road map for litigants seeking to overturn adverse
recusal rulings on appeal based on due process grounds-it teaches that a
probability of bias must be shown to justify recusal based on a constitutional
denial of due process. Justice Kennedy made it clear that resolving disputes over
recusal decisions in most state court cases will usually be accomplished purely
by enforcing state court ethical standards, without any need for applying the
proof test for cases where due process rights are at issue:

been used to benefit the judge's judicial campaign. See Petition for Rehearing at 3-4, Dupre, 129 S.
Ct. 200 (No. 08-41), 2008 WL 4792481.
62. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. The Court's opinion explained:
Caperton contends that Blankenship's pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin
elected created a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias. Though not a
bribe or criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude
to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected. That temptation,
Caperton claims, is as strong and inherent in human nature as was the conflict the Court
confronted in Tumey ....
Id. The Supreme Court's acceptance of Caperton's argument thus enshrines "debt of
gratitude" in the appearance of impropriety test lexicon. See id
63. 39 P.3d 791 (Okla. 2001).
64. Id. at 798-99.
65. See id. at 799-800.
66. See Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 789 N.W.2d 444, 444-45 (Mich. 2010).
67. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 61, at 3-4; see also Avery v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006); In re
Disqualification of Burnside, 863 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 883 (2006).
Burnside involved allegations of impartiality against a judge based on campaign contributions that
the judge had received in the past. See Burnside, 863 N.E.2d at 618-19. In Avery, a state supreme
court justice had allegedly received "more than $1 million in direct and indirect campaign
contributions from a party and its supporters, while that party's case [was] pending." Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Avery, 835 N.E.2d 801 (No. 05-84), 2005 WL 3662258.
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"The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain
free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than
those we find mandated here today." Because the codes of judicial
conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most
disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the
Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in
this case will thus be confined to rare instances.
Caperton will have a direct impact on appellate standards in state recusal
cases that require proof of actual bias in order to overturn a lower court judge's
refusal to recuse.6 It directly calls into question the validity of a recent South
Carolina recusal case, Simpson v. Simpson, 70 which held that a complainant must
make a "showing of actual prejudice" in order to overturn a trial court judge's
refusal to recuse.n Caperton, of course, rejects any requirement that a party
present on appeal some proof of actual bias or prejudice in order to win a
reversal premised on a lower court judge's failure to recuse.72 This result, tied to
due process requirements, plainly amounts to lowering the bar for proof of
unethical conduct, and makes it likely that judges' ethical behavior will be

68. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (citation omitted)
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)).
69. See, e.g., Irvin v. State, 49 S.W.3d 635, 643 (Ark. 2001) (holding that a showing of actual
bias or prejudice is needed in order to require recusal of trial judge); Simpson v. Simpson, 377 S.C.
519, 526, 660 S.E.2d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that the moving party "failed
to present any evidence of prejudice or bias"); State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988)
("[W]hile we recommend the practice that ajudge recuse himself where there is a colorable claim of
bias or prejudice, absent a showing of actual bias or an abuse of discretion, failure to do so does not
constitute reversible error . . . .").
70. 377 S.C. 519, 660 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
71. Id. at 525, 660 S.E.2d at 277. South Carolina is by no means alone in adhering to an
actual bias standard for mandatory recusal. See, e.g, Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1051-55 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993) (per curiam) (finding that despite "the appearance of impropriety," a trial judge's
conduct did not require recusal); Allen v. Rutledge, 139 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Ark. 2003) (holding a
judge should have recused himself where there was "obvious bias"); State v. Canales, 916 A.2d
767, 782 (Conn. 2007) ("Even if we were to agree that an appearance of bias arose from [the]
circumstances, we would not conclude that the trial court's actions violated due process without
some indication of actual bias."); Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Freemont Cnty., 148 P.3d 1247,
1260 (Idaho 2006) ("[W]e require a showing of actual bias before disqualifying a decision maker
even when a litigant maintains a decision maker has deprived the proceedings of the appearance of
fairness." (citing Davisco Food Int'l, Inc. v. Gooding Cnty., 118 P.3d 116, 123-24 (Idaho 2005))).
But see State v. Brown, 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Haw. 1989) ("[Tjhis ruling may have the effect of
sometimes barring 'trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to
weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.' Yet, 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."' (citation omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954);
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))); Commonwealth v. Brandenburg, 114 S.W.3d 830,
834 (Ky. 2003) ("[T]here need not be an actual claim of bias or impropriety levied, but the mere
appearance that such an impropriety might exist is enough to implicate due process concerns.").
72. See supratext accompanying notes 43-47.
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scrutinized more often and more closely in the future. Caperton gives a green
light to suspicious litigants by moving the proof threshold from the realm of
practical impossibility to a zone in which reversal based on ethical misconduct
(or the appearance of the same) can actually occur. Unquestionably, proving that
a judge is subject to a serious risk of bias is far easier than proving that the
judge's ruling actually was affected by bias.
Since proof of a serious risk of judicial bias establishes a due process
violation under Caperton,the need for a showing of actual prejudice in order to
win a recusal case in South Carolina is a requirement that in effect has been
overruled. This result is only fair. After all, why should a litigant whose trial
has been tainted by the judge's violation of the appearance of impropriety
standard (i.e., unethical behavior on the judge's part) have to prove something
more than that in order to prevail on appeal?

IV. RECUSAL BASED ON THE APPEARANCE STANDARD IN SOUTH CAROLINA
TODAY
The most prominent recusal case in South Carolina is an oddity. Though it

has been said that the case's outcome has left South Carolina judges "terrified,""
the matter was not decided by any court or judicial ethical tribunal; rather, the
decision was handed down by the South Carolina Judicial Merit Selection
Commission in late 2009 in connection with Judge F.P. ("Charlie") SegarsAndrews's application for reappointment to the Family Court in Charleston.
The Commission's decision was in response to a complaint filed by William R.
Simpson, Jr., who was disgruntled over Judge Segars-Andrews's handling of his
domestic case.7s
By the time Judge Segars-Andrews appeared before the Judicial Merit
Selection Commission, her ethical conduct in dealing with Mr. Simpson's
complaint had already been the subject of a ruling at the trial court level (by
her), a ruling by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Simpson v. Simpson,
and a ruling by the South Carolina Supreme Court's Commission on Judicial

73. Robert Behre, Lawyer: 'EveryJudge I Know Is Terrified,' PosT & COURIER (Charleston,
S.C.), Dec. 16, 2009, at Bl.
74. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 4-5.

Jr.).

75. See Public Hearing Exhibit 1, supra note 19, at 1-5 (affidavit of William R. Simpson,
76. Judge Segars-Andrews's order ruling on Mr. Simpson's recusal motion is contained in
the record on appeal in Simpson v. Simpson, 377 S.C. 519, 660 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 2008) (per
curiam), which was incorporated as Exhibit 16 to the public hearing on Judge Segars-Andrews's
qualifications before the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. See Public Hearing on Judicial
Qualificationsfor Judge Segars-Andrews Before the Judicial Merit Selection Commission, Exhibit
16, pt. 1, at 88-102 (S.C. Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Simpson Appellate Record], available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judiciahneritpage/Transcriptlnfol202O9/091202fsaEx16pl.pdf.
77. 377 S.C. 519, 660 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
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Conduct
In each case, the ruling had been favorable to Judge SegarsAndrews.79 The Judicial Merit Selection Commission's ruling was different.8
Evaluating Judge Segars-Andrews's suitability to serve another six-year term on
the Family Court, the Commission considered her qualifications in light of the
Commission's nine evaluative criteria.8' By a vote of 7-3, the Commission
determined that she met all the criteria except one-ethical fitness.82 Because of
that important failing, Judge Segars-Andrews's reappointment was prevented
from being voted on by the General Assembly, and she lost her judgeship. 8 3
Many people, including lawyers and judges, may have difficulty
understanding how a judge's behavior that passes muster with an appellate court
and the Commission on Judicial Conduct can be held improper and unethical by
any other group. The remainder of this Article addresses that legitimate concern.
The aim is twofold-first, to explain why, based on the underlying facts, the
Judicial Merit Selection Commission found that Judge Segars-Andrews erred in
failing to recuse based on an appearance of impropriety, and second, to identify
lessons that can be drawn from the episode that may be of value to judges who
are called to deal with recusal issues in the future.
V. FACTS UNDERLYING THE SEGARS-ANDREWS RULING
Judge Segars-Andrews presented herself to the Commission for screening as
a veteran and respected jurist.8 4 She had served continuously since having first
been elected in 1993 to serve on the Family Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit.85
Her various professional accomplishments included work on the Charleston
County Drug Court, for which she received recognition in the form of a
unanimous resolution passed by the South Carolina House in 2008.86 Through

78. See Public Hearing on Judicial Qualificationsfor Judge Segars-Andrews Before the
Judicial Merit Selection Commission, Exhibit 5, at 7-9 (S.C. Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Public
Hearing Exhibit 5], available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/Transcript
Infol20209/09l202fsaEx05.pdf (correspondence from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to Mr.
Simpson).
79. See Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 115 & n.1, 691
S.E.2d 453, 456 & n.1 (2010) (per curiam).
80. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-12.
81. See id. at 2. The Commission evaluates a candidate based on whether he or she meets (1)
the requisite constitutional and statutory requirements, as well as the standards for: "(2) ethical
fitness; (3) professional and academic ability; (4) character; (5) reputation; (6) physical health; (7)
mental stability; (8) experience; and (9) judicial temperament." S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-35(A)
(2005).
82. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18 at 31.
83. See Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 114-15, 691 S.E.2d at 456.
84. See id. at 114, 691 S.E.2d at 456.
85. Id. at 114, 691 S.E.2d at 456.
86. H.R. 5292, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2008), available at http://www.
scstatehouse.gov/sessl 17 2007-2008/hjO8/5368.htm#p5447.
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that resolution, the South Carolina House voted "to honor her for the exceptional
difference she [had] made in Charleston County."87
When she appeared before the Judicial Merit Selection Commission in
November of 2009, Judge Segars-Andrews faced no opposition; she had every
reason to believe her reelection would follow in due course, provided she was
found qualified and nominated by the Commission." There was, however, an
impediment standing in her way-a disgruntled family court litigant, Mr.
William R. Simpson, Jr., who had filed a complaint with the Commission
attacking Judge Segars-Andrews's refusal to recuse herself in the face of a
disqualification motion he had made in connection with his divorce case." Both
Mr. Simpson and his divorce lawyer, Steven S. McKenzie, appeared at the
hearing and testified against Judge Segars-Andrews. 90 To understand the story
told at the Segars-Andrews hearing, it is necessary to first understand the facts
underlying Mr. Simpson's divorce case and Judge Segars-Andrews's role as a
decisionmaker in the matter.
Mr. Simpson's ethics attack on Judge Segars-Andrews was a by-product of
two failed marriages in which the two husbands, both Clarendon County
farmers, were father and son.9 1 The men owned a family farming operation,
Simpson Farms, LLC, in which both were members.92 The father, William
Robert Simpson, Sr., was divorced from his wife, Daisy Wallace Simpson, in
2004.93 The focal point for consideration of Judge Segars-Andrews's qualification
is her rulings in the subsequent Simpson family divorce case, this one involving
the son, Mr. William R. Simpson, Jr.
The lawyers in both Simpson family divorce cases were the same-Jan
Warner and James McLaren represented the wife in each matter, and Steven
McKenzie and Scott Robinson represented the husbands. Additionally, Mr.
Simpson was a party defendant in his father's earlier divorce case due to his co96
Thus, Mr. Simpson and his
ownership interest in Simpson Farms, LLC.
cases. Judge Segarsin
both
Simpson
family
divorce
lawyers were involved

87. Id.
88. See Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 115, 691 S.E.2d at 456.
89. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-8.
90. See id. at 9-10.
91. Id. at 21 (comments of Professor John P. Freeman).
92. Id.
93. See Simpson Appellate Record, supranote 76, at 14-56.
94. See MEIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-6. Henceforth, when this
Article refers to "Mr. Simpson," it is referring to Mr. William R. Simpson, Jr., and Mr. William R.
Simpson, Sr. will be designated as such. When the Article refers to "Mrs. Simpson," it is referring
to Mrs. Becky Simpson, Mr. Simpson's ex-wife.
95. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 21 (comments of Professor
John P. Freeman).
96. See id.
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Andrews had no involvement in the prior divorce case between Mr. Simpson, Sr.
and Mrs. Daisy Simpson. 97
Our focus now turns to the second Simpson family divorce case, brought by
Mr. Simpson, the son. On July 30, 2004, Mr. Simpson brought his domestic case
against his wife of nearly fifteen years as an action for "Separate Maintenance
and Support and for Approval of an Agreement."98 As originally formulated by
Mr. Simpson and his legal counsel, the second Simpson domestic case was not a
true adversary proceeding; Mrs. Simpson had been induced to sign a "Pro Se
Answer" at the time the complaint was filed.9 Mr. Simpson's lawyer drafted
both the complaint served on Mrs. Simpson as well as the answer that she
filed.100 Mrs. Simpson signed the agreement at her husband's lawyer's office,
without having her own lawyer present.101 Under that agreement, Mrs. Simpson
gave up her right to substantial marital assets. 02
When the Family Court initially approved the agreement, Mrs. Simpson
appeared pro se.103 She subsequently retained her own lawyers, and then
challenged the agreement for various reasons. 104 In seeking to overturn the
agreement, Mrs. Simpson's lawyers challenged her competence to enter into the
agreement based on her "mental condition/status when the agreement was
executed and approved," 0 5 claims of nondisclosure by Mr. Simpson, and her
contention that "there had been frauds perpetrated against both [her] and the
Court." 106 Judge McFadden, who initially approved the one-sided agreement

97. Judge R. Wright Turbeville handed down the final decree of divorce in that case. See
Simpson Appellate Record, supranote 76, at 56.
98. Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 58 para. 1.
99. Id. at para. 2 An order later entered in Mr. Simpson's divorce case by Judge SegarsAndrews made the following findings:
On or about July 30, 2004, Husband took Wife, accompanied by her elderly
grandfather, to his attorney who had prepared a separation agreement for Husband and
Wife to sign. Wife signed the agreement. It was then approved by The Honorable
George E. McFadden and made the order of the family court on August 20, 2004.
Subsequently, Wife filed a motion to set aside the agreement. This motion was granted
by Judge McFadden on January 6, 2005.
Id. at 107 para. 11.
100. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 21 (comments of Professor

John P. Freeman).
101. Simpson Appellate record, supra note 76, at 107 para. 11.
102. In their Motion to Vacate Order and Set Aside Agreement, Mrs. Simpson's attorneys
argued, "Of more than $700,000.00 in assets acquired by Husband, Wife is to receive approximately
5 percent (5%) which is totally unreasonable and far from equitable." Simpson Appellate Record,
supranote 76, at 163 para. 25.
103. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 22 (comments of Professor

John P. Freeman).
104. See Simpson Appellate record, supra note 76, at 57-59.
105. Id. at 58 para. 6. Mrs. Simpson had been diagnosed with panic and bipolar disorders, and
also suffered from depression and anxiety attacks. Id. at 59 para. 8(1).
106. Id. at 58-59 para 6.
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executed by Mrs. Simpson when she was not represented by counsel,
subsequently set it aside at the behest of her newly hired attorneys.107
By the time Judge Segars-Andrews arrived on the scene, the separation
agreement-created on behalf of Mr. Simpson to eliminate his wife's rights to a
substantial share of the marital assets-had already been set aside. * Mr.
Simpson had already been granted a divorce based on his wife's adultery, which
evidently occurred after she had been induced to enter into the one-sided
separation agreement.1 09 The issues that Judge Segars-Andrews ruled on
concerned visitation, equitable division, and attorneys' fees and costs. 10
The Family Court hearing in the Simpson divorce covering those issues was
held on February 14 and 16, 2006.111 On March 13, 2006, the court issued
detailed written instructions for a final order on all remaining issues and
requested that Mrs. Simpson's counsel, Mr. Warner and Mr. McLaren, prepare
and submit a proposed order consistent with those instructions.112 For our
purposes, the crucial determination made by Judge Segars-Andrews and set forth
in her instructions, dealt with the legal fees-specifically, her instruction that
Mr. Simpson be required to pay half of the fees incurred by his wife in the
matter.
The basis for this ruling harkened back to the separation agreement
devised by Mr. Simpson and his lawyer and signed by Mrs. Simpson before she
had her own legal counsel.
Had the short-lived agreement as drafted by Mr. Simpson's lawyer not later
been challenged by Mrs. Simpson's attorney and then thrown out by Judge
McFadden, Mr. Simpson's later ethics-based attack on Judge Segars-Andrews's
qualifications almost certainly would not have arisen. This is because, absent
that agreement, the property split between the husband and wife in divorce
would have been sixty to forty in the husband's favor, with each side paying its
own fees. Had this occurred, Mr. Simpson almost certainly would not have
raised any complaint about the judge's fairness.
As noted above, Judge Segars-Andrews ultimately determined that Mr.
Simpson should be required to cover half of his wife's legal fees. She discussed
why she did so in her testimony at the hearing before the Judicial Merit Selection
Commission:

107. See id. at 57-61.
108. The voided agreement came up before Judge Segars-Andrews based on Mr. Simpson's
contention that he should be given credit for money he had paid his wife under it. As to this
contention, Judge Segars-Andrews ruled, "The Court finds that the agreement was unconscionable
and that Plaintiff would have otherwise been supporting Wife during this period. This Court
concludes that the Husband should be given no credit for this." Id. at 115 para. 42.
109. See id, at 83 para 1.
110. Id at 104. A consent order dated March 7, 2006 had resolved the issues of visitation and
custody. Id.

111. Id.
112. See id. at 367-70.
113. Id.at 369.
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Then I go to the issue of attorneys' fees. What has not come out is
that initially Mr. Simpson had his wife sign an agreement. That
agreement gave her, I believe, and I don't remember exactly like, [$135or $40,000 [in] all. And this was an estate worth [$]7- or $800,000. So
she had to hire attorneys to have that agreement overturned, so she could
get some assets.
That is-if this case had come up without that fact, he probably
would have not-1 would have not ordered him to pay any attorneys'
fees except a little bit for the experts because they gave me the
information that I had to deal with.

If he had not had her sign that agreement, he would have prevailed
on every issue, and I would not have ordered attorneys' fees. But
[because of] having her sign the agreement where she had to hire
attorneys to overturn it[,] [s]he did prevail because she did end up
getting her 40 percent of the whole. And 1, following the rules of
Family Court, the statute and the case law, I had to order attorneys'
fees.
The attorneys' fee award in favor of Mrs. Simpson approved by Judge SegarsAndrews following the trial was approximately $78,000. 115 Though the amount
may seem high, Mr. Simpson's counsel never disputed the factual
representations within Mrs. Simpson's fee petition supporting the request.' 16
Stated differently, Mr. Simpson presented no evidence showing that the fees
sought by counsel for Mrs. Simpson were unreasonable. Earlier, in Mr.

114. Transcript of Public Hearing on Judicial Qualifications, Afternoon Session at 24-25
(Nov. 4, 2009) (hereinafter Transcript of Nov. 4 Public Hearing, Afternoon Session], available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpagelTranscriptlnfol20209/TranscriptnfoDecember2009
.htnl (follow "Judge Segars-Andrews Testimony in Public Hearing on November 4, 2009, Day 3"
hyperlink).
115. See Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 125-27. Before the Commission, Mr.
Simpson's counsel appeared to contend that the award of $78,000 in fees was particularly improper
because Judge Myers had already ordered him to pay $37,500 as an advance for attorneys' fees.
See Transcript of Nov. 4 Public Hearing, Afternoon Session, supra note 114, at 67-69. However,
Judge Segars-Andrews ruled that the $37,500 would be treated as an advance of Mrs. Simpson's
equitable distribution proceeds, meaning that Mr. Simpson was given credit for the $37,500
payment in figuring the amount owed to Mrs. Simpson out of her 40% of marital assets. See
Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 115 para. 43, 121 para. 60.
116. In the court's Final Order for Equitable Division, Child Support, Attorneys' Fees, and
Costs, Judge Segars-Andrews noted, "At the close of Defendant's case, Defendant [Mrs. Simpson]
presented an affidavit and testimony with regard to attorneys' fees. There was no reply testimony
from the Plaintiff [Mr. Simpson], and Defendant's testimony and exhibits in this regard are
uncontradicted." Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 123 para. 67.
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Simpson's father's related case, Judge Turbeville had ordered Mr. Simpson, Sr.
to pay $85,000 toward his wife's fees.111 This was in addition to the $15,000
that he had been ordered to pay at an earlier hearing.118 Thus, in the first
Simpson divorce case, Mr. Simpson, Sr. had been ordered to pay $100,000
toward his wife's legal fees. Accordingly, the fee approved by Judge SegarsAndrews in the second Simpson divorce case was both unchallenged, and was
also in line with a fee award granted by a different judge on behalf of the wife in
the earlier Simpson divorce case.
After trial-and subsequent to Judge Segars-Andrews's issuance of
instruction for drawing the order on the remaining issues (including the fee
award to Mrs. Simpson)--Mr. Simpson raised for the first time an ethics issue
targeting Judge Segars-Andrews. He did so by filing a Notice of Motion and
Motion for a New Trial Based Upon the Failure of the Defendant's Counsel to
Disclose the Court's Conflict of Interests,119 which contended that Judge SegarsAndrews was disqualified because her husband's law partner, Lon Shull of the
Charleston Bar, had rendered an affidavit fourteen months earlier in support of
the fee petition submitted by McLaren and Warner in the father's divorce case.120
Mr. Simpson testified in an affidavit accompanying his motion that he had been
a party to his parents' divorce case in which Mr. Shull's affidavit had been filed,
and that he was not aware that Mr. Shull was Judge Segars-Andrews's husband's
law partner until after Judge Segars-Andrews had tried his case and issued her
instructions as to fees.12 1 No evidence was presented suggesting that Judge
Segars-Andrews was aware of Mr. Shull's involvement in Mr. Simpson's
father's divorce case until his lawyer brought it to her attention after Mr.
Simpson's divorce case was tried.
Judge Segars-Andrews subsequently denied the motion for recusal premised
on the Shull affidavit filed in Mr. Simpson's father's case. 122 If Mr. Simpson's
recusal complaint had rested entirely on the contention that Judge SegarsAndrews was required to recuse herself because of the affidavit that Mr. Shull
had filed, Judge Segars-Andrews would almost certainly still be a Family Court
judge. On those facts, an appearance of impropriety claim was simply too

117. Id at 71.
118. See id. at 16 para. 8.
119. Id. at 209-11.
120. See id. at 209-10 paras. 1-3. I note in passing that Mr. Shull's affidavit does more than
simply opine on a reasonable fee number for Mr. Warner and Mr. McLaren based on the facts of
Mr. Simpson, Sr.'s divorce case; it also excoriates Mr. Simpson, Sr. for "deception, delay and
obfuscation," id at 219 para. 24, and refers to "the apparent conspiracy of a father and son," id. at
para. 26. Within the affidavit itself, Mr. Shull identifies himself as a partner in the firm of Andrews
and Shull, id. at 213 para. 3, and most pages of the affidavit in the court record have a fax header
indicating that it was sent from the firm, see id. at 213-23.
121. See id. at 227-28.
122. Id. at 88-101.
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attenuated and ephemeral to require recusal.
However, as described below,
Judge Segars-Andrews's reflection on Mr. Simpson's motion led her to realize
that a second, more legitimate basis existed for recusal, one not yet known to Mr.
Simpson. She raised this second matter sua sponte at a hearing convened to
cover the recusal issue. On the record she made the following comments to the
parties, outlining the nature of the problem and her views on its impact:
Okay; this is Simpson versus Simpson, Case Number 04-243 and
315-I think it's been consolidated. This started out as a motion filed
by the plaintiff asking me to recuse myself because my husband's law
partner was involved in another, arguably, related case.
I denied that motion; however, once it was-I mentioned this to my
husband, I was told that-something that I had forgotten-Mr. McLaren
and my husband's law firm has also been involved in another matter
together that does-not involving a small amount of money, and it is
something that if I had remembered that I would have disclosed and
asked you initially if you wanted me to recuse myself.
I did not think about that, so I'm going to have to recuse myself.
You all have to retry the case.

...

I mean, I understand the canons, and if I had thought about this

on the first day of trial, I would have disclosed it and said, you all need
to find another judge.
I did not think about it. I heard the case, I decided the case. When
you sent me that motion, I thought it was a frivolous motion, and I was
talking to my husband about it and he said, did you think about this?
You know, and I just-I mean, I just do not think in good conscience-I
mean, that is not a small amount of money, and it was a few years ago,
but, still-and it's something that I don't think would prejudice any
judge, but it still should have been disclosed; and, I can't, at this point,
remedy that.

123. See, e.g, S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 04-2010 (2010)
[hereinafter Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct], available at http://www.judicial.
state.se.us/advisoryopinions/displayadvopin.cfim?advOpinNo=04-2010 (explaining that a judge is
not disqualified on appearance grounds based solely on a spouse's involvement as co-counsel in a
different case). Here, there is no evidence that Judge Segars-Andrews's husband had any
involvement at all in Mr. Simpson's father's case. Moreover, his law partner's only involvement
was as a witness on the reasonableness of Mrs. Daisy Simpson's lawyers' fee petition. See supra
note 120 and accompanying text.
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It should have been disclosed, I didn't think about it, so I didn't
disclose it. I don't see how I can remedy it.12 4
Following her oral comments indicating that she needed to recuse herself, Judge
Segars-Andrews received a memorandum of law from Mrs. Simpson's
counsel,125 bolstered by an ethics expert's supporting affidavit.12 6 The combined
effect of the memorandum and the affidavit caused her to reverse course and
conclude that she had no disabling conflict requiring recusal, but instead had a
"duty to sit" in the case.127
It was Mr. Simpson's appeal from Judge Segars-Andrews's refusal to recuse
herself that triggered the decision by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in
Simpson v. Simpson.128 There, the court affirmed Judge Segars-Andrews's order
denying the recusal motion and concluded that Mr. Simpson failed to establish
that he was prejudiced by any alleged unprofessional conduct on the part of
Judge Segars-Andrews. 12 Subsequently, Mr. Simpson filed an ethics charge
asserting the same facts against Judge Segars-Andrews before the Commission
on Judicial Conduct, and the Commission dismissed the charge.130
By the time she appeared before the Judicial Merit Selection Commission,
Judge Segars-Andrews's decision not to recuse herself in Simpson had thus been
endorsed by an ethics expert, upheld by a reviewing appellate court, and found
proper by the Commission on Judicial Conduct. In light of this history, she
obviously had good reason to expect smooth sailing before the Judicial Merit
Selection Commission, even in the face of the ethics complaint (Mr. Simpson's
fourth separate attack 3 1) that had been filed against her.

124. Simpson Appellate Record, supranote 76, at 135-37.
125. See id. at 231-42.
126. See id. at 319-27.
127. See id. at 93-97, 101. For a discussion questioning the appellate court's "duty to sit"
analysis in Simpson v. Simpson, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic
Persistenceof the Duty to Sit, 57 BuFF. L. REV. 813, 941 (2009).
128. 377 S.C. 519, 660 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
129. Id. at 526, 660 S.E.2d at 278.
130. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Both the ethical grievance and the ruling by
the Supreme Court's Office of Disciplinary Counsel were presented to the Commission on Judicial
Conduct for review. See Public Hearing Exhibit 5, supra note 78, at 3-9. In his testimony before
the Judicial Merit Selection Commission, Mr. Simpson's counsel suggested that the Commission on
Judicial Conduct simply rejected the grievance out of hand without careful consideration; the
implication was that partiality was shown by the disciplinary authorities in favor of Judge SegarsAndrews, who was then serving as vice chairman of the Commission on Judicial Conduct. See
MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 10. There was never any proof that either
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or the Commission on Judicial Conduct improperly handled the
grievance against Judge Segars-Andrews. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18,

at 27 (comments of Professor John P. Freeman).
131. Mr. Simpson filed his first complaint against Judge Segars-Andrews in family court, the
second was lodged before the South Carolina Court of Appeals, and the third was filed before the
Commission on Judicial Conduct. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 6-8.
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There would be no smooth sailing for Judge Segars-Andrews before the
Judicial Merit Selection Commission, however. When asked by the Commissioners
about the size of the fee that came to her husband's law firm, Judge SegarsAndrews responded, "I think it was probably around [$]300,000. That's my
guess." 132 A Commissioner then asked her whether that was her husband's share
or if the fee represented the gross sum that was split between Judge SegarsAndrews's husband and his law partner, Mr. Shull, to which she replied, "Ithink
that was probably my husband's share on that case."133
When added together, the facts before the Commission showed that while
Mr. Simpson's divorce case was pending, and about one year before Judge
Segars-Andrews tried the property and fee issues in that case, her husband
received a $300,000 share of a fee flowing from a case handled by his law
partner and Mrs. Simpson's counsel.134 From the standpoint of Judge SegarsAndrews's husband, the $300,000 payment was basically a windfall, since it was
his personal share of his law firm's fee in a case he did not handle. It was her
focus on this large payment-originally described by her to the parties as "not
involving a small amount of money"-that led Judge Seagars-Andrews to
originally conclude that she needed to recuse herself.13 The sum her husband
had received as a fee from Mrs. Simpson's lawyer truly was not "a small amount
of money." It was more than what Judge Segars-Andrews could earn for two
years' service as a family court judge.'36
In his recusal motion before Judge Segars-Andrews, Mr. Simpson contended
that the proceedings had been contaminated by "at least the appearance of
impropriety."13 7 Judge Segars-Andrews never addressed this contention in the
order she wrote rejecting Mr. Simpson's recusal motion; to be precise, in her
order denying recusal, she never explicitly mentioned the important phrase,
"appearance of impropriety."138 Nor was that ethical standard ever mentioned or
referred to by Mrs. Simpson's lawyers or their ethics expert when they argued to

132. Transcript ofNov. 4 Public Hearing, Afternoon Session, supra note 114, at 36.
133. Id. In fact, in her order addressing Mr. Simpson's recusal motion, Judge Segars-Andrews
had disclosed the following:
In approximately 2003[,] Mr. McLaren and Mr. Shull began representing a Plaintiff in
a wrongful death case. That case was settled in December 2004. The settlement was
paid in early 2005. At that time[, Andrews and Shull received a six figure
contingency feet,] which was divided between Mr. Shull and Mr. Andrews per their
partnership agreement.
Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 91 n.3.
134. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 26 (comments of Professor

John P. Freeman).
135. Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 135.
136. The current annual pay rate for a family court judge in South Carolina is $126,883. SC
Salary Database, THE STATE (July 23, 2010), http://www.thestate.com/statesalaries/?app
Session=858201458224837 (choose "Judicial Department" from the "Agency" drop-down box;
then type "Family Court" in the "Title" search field).
137. Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 228.
138. See id at 88-102.
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Judge Se ars-Andrews that she owed a duty to sit in the case and not recuse
herself.13 Moreover, the phrase "appearance of impropriety" does not appear
anywhere in Mrs. Simpson's brief filed before the Court of Appeals, 14 0 even
though Mr. Simpson's brief argued that the appearance standard had been
violated and used the phrase "appearance of impropriety" ten different times. 141
In siding with Mrs. Simpson, the Court of Appeals decided Simpson v.
Simpson without the phrase "appearance of impropriety" showing up anywhere
in its ruling, even though Mr. Simpson based his argument principally on the
contention that the appearance standard had been violated. 14 2 Nor was the phrase
ever used by the Commission on Judicial Conduct in denying Mr. Simpson's
grievance against Judge Segars-Andrews; the Commission dismissed Mr.
Simpson's grievance at a preliminary stage without a full factual analysis. 14 3
One enduring legacy arising from the Segars-Andrews incident will be
this-rulings issued in cases where the existence of an appearance of
impropriety is alleged against a judge need to confront that issue, rule on it, and
provide reasons supporting the ruling. Rulings that dance around the issue, or
avoid it entirely, resolve nothing and are counterproductive in that they enhance
the complaining party's suspicion that, in the vernacular, "The fix is in."
Though Mr. Simpson's appearance of impropriety charge never achieved
traction before Judge Segars-Andrews or in the Court of Appeals, things changed
when he made the same argument before the Judicial Merit Selection
Commission. The appearance of impropriety charge resonated in that forum.
The key witness in favor of Mr. Simpson's position was neither Mr. Simpson nor
his lawyer; instead, it was Judge Segars-Andrews herself, speaking to the
Commission from the printed word found in the family court record for
Simpson. 144 It was impossible for the Commission to ignore the strong
unequivocal language used by Judge Segars-Andrews when she first described
the fee conflict issue to Mr. Simpson and his lawyer:
Mr. McLaren and my husband's law firm [have] also been involved in
another matter together that does-not involving a small amount of
money, and it is something that if I had remembered that I would have
disclosedand askedyou initially ifyou wanted me to recuse myself

139. See id. at 307-27.
140. See Final Brief of Respondent, Simpson v. Simpson, 377 S.C. 519, 660 S.E.2d 274 (Ct.
App. 2008) (per curiam) (No. 2004-DR-14-243 & 315).
141. See Final Brief of Appellant at 11-14, Simpson, 377 S.C. 519, 660 S.E.2d 274 (No.
2004-DR-14-243 & 315).
142. Simpson, 377 S.C. at 521-26, 660 S.E.2d 275-78.
143. See Public Hearing Exhibit 5, supra note 78, at 7-9. Indeed, the Commission ruled that
not only was recusal over Judge Segars-Andrews's husband's fee not required, but that Judge
Segars-Andrews was not even "ethically required" to make a disclosure about the $300,000 fee paid
by the wife's lawyer. See id. at 8.
144. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supranote 18, at 6-8.
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I did not think about that, so Fm going to have to recuse myself
You all have to retry the case.

[I]f I had thought about this on the first day of trial, I would
have disclosed it andsaid,you all need to find anotherjudge.

...

[I]t's something that I don't think would prejudice any judge,

but it still should have been disclosed; and, I can't, at this point, remedy
that.
It should have been disclosed, I didn't think about it, so I didn't

disclose it. I don't see how I can remedy it.145
If this were not strong enough, Judge Segars-Andrews then went on to make
clear that these were not off-the-cuff remarks, but that she had already carefully
studied the issue; she stated, "I have looked at the Rules over and over, because I
feel like I really have done a disservice by not disclosing this and causing your
1 46
clients to have to go through another trial."

In essence, the Commission agreed with Judge Segars-Andrews's words,
which conceded a conflict problem that was sufficiently serious to call for full
and prompt disclosure to the parties who then would have had a right to agree or
disagree on remittal of disqualification.14 7 The disclosure was made later than it
should have been,148 meaning that the looming appearance problem had become
aggravated in Mr. Simpson's eyes at the time of disclosure.14 9 The aggravating
factor arose when Judge Segars-Andrews issued her instruction that Mr.
Simpson was to pay the McLaren-Warner team nearly $80,000 toward his wife's

145. Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 135-37 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
147. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 3F ("A judge. .. may disclose on the record the basis of
the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the
presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for
disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers,
without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge
is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceeding.").
148. The disclosure should have been made at the outset; ignorance of the large fee was no
defense. Judge Segars-Andrews was under an ethical obligation to "make a reasonable effort to
keep informed about the personal economic interests of [her] spouse." Id at Canon 3E(2). Failure
to disclose can itself provide a basis for a recusal motion: "When a judge fails to disclose
information to the parties that the judge knew or should have known, this failure to disclose could
provide the basis for a motion to disqualify." Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety:
Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETIucs 55, 69 (2000).
149. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 19.
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Mr. Simpson
legal fees to-far more than he was paying his own lawyer.
could not have been happy when he learned that Mr. McLaren-who was to
receive Mr. Simpson's check for a substantial fee-had himself recently paid
Judge Segars-Andrews's husband's law firm a legal fee "not involving a small
amount of money." 152
Each member of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission concluded that,
having first decided based on all the facts known to her that she needed to step
aside, Judge Segars-Andrews should have followed through and maintained her
recusal.153 Instead, Judge Segars-Andrews reversed course, accepting the
positions advanced by Mrs. Simpson's counsel and their expert, without offering
Mr. Simpson and his counsel a full opportunity to respond to the judge's
decision to change her thinking. When she appeared before the Commission,
Judge Segars-Andrews conceded that in hindsight she should have held a hearing
to announce her decision that she was not going to recuse herself.154 As it was,
Judge Segars-Andrews's reversal caught Mr. Simpson and his counsel by
complete surprise; they had every reason to expect her to adhere to her original
recusal position stated in open court because she had announced it in
unequivocal terms. 155
Judge Segars-Andrews's decision to flip-flop on the recusal issue was her
undoing. Having proclaimed the existence of a de facto appearance of
impropriety, she needed to get out of the case absent consent of the parties
through remittal of disqualification, which, in light of Mr. Simpson's opposition,
was not an option. Her flip-flopping on the recusal issue was not unprecedented
in the annals of judicial ethics, however. In Perotti v. State,156 the Court of
Appeals of Alaska disqualified a judge based on appearance of partiality grounds
when the judge initially made an offer to recuse and then reversed course.157 In

150. See Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 126.
151. The Judicial Merit Selection Commission found that "Mrs. Simpson's attorneys' legal
fees were over $160,000, while Mr. Simpson's legal fees were less than $9,000, more than 20 times
Mr. Simpson's legal fees." MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 18.
152. Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 135.
153. See MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 12 (finding of the
Commission), 16-17 (comments of Sen. Glenn F. McConnell), 20-21 (comments of Mr. H1.Donald
Sellers), 27-28 (comments of Professor John P. Freeman).
154. See Transcript of Nov. 4 Public Hearing, Afternoon Session, supra note 114, at 84 ("If I
had to do it over again, sir, I would have called another hearing and let them know that I had
reviewed things and that I had to change-I was wrong.").
155. The following is an excerpt from an exchange between Judge Segars-Andrews and Mr.
Simpson's lawyer that took place at the April 14, 2006 hearing in family court:
The Court: I'm going to have to recuse myself. You all have to retry the case.
Mr. McKenzie: Thank you, Your Honor. Do you want me to prepare an order, or
will the Court prepare one? OrThe Court: I'll prepare one.
Mr. McKenzie: Thank you, Your Honor.
Simpson Appellate Record, supranote 76, at 135.
156. 806 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
157. See id. at 326-27, 330.
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the reviewing court's eyes, the judge's own recognition of the problem was
"uniquely significant on the issue of appearance of partiality,"' and "certainly
enhanced the appearance" of impropriety.15 9 A judge who stays in a case after
personally verbalizing that the facts in question may provide a basis for
disqualification raises "doubt[s] as to impartiality and fairness," 16 0 which
obviously is not a good thing for a judge to do.
Although the Commissioners unanimously agreed that Judge SegarsAndrews's conduct created an appearance of impropriety,161 the Commission
split 7-3 in its determination that she lacked the requisite "ethical fitness" to
continue on the bench. 162 That finding of unfitness was entirely attributable to
her handling of Mr. Simpson's divorce case-and principally due to her failure
to recuse-coupled with what one member of the Commission categorized as her
refusal "to even acknowledge her mistake in handling the conflict issue in the
Simpson case until after the Commission's hearing was concluded and the vote
on her qualifications cast."1 63 Judge Segars-Andrews subsequently filed an
appeal from the Commission's ruling to the South Carolina Supreme Court, but
her request for relief was denied.164
VI. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN

Judges, lawyers, and members of the public who believe that the Judicial
Merit Selection Commission's finding of ethical misconduct on the part of Judge
Segars-Andrews runs directly counter to decided authority in her favor need to
reconsider that position. They should focus carefully on the fact that the
Simpson record reflects that the appearance of impropriety allegations raised by
Mr. Simpson in his motion to recuse were never directly and explicitly addressed
by Judge Segars-Andrews, or by Mrs. Simpson's lawyers or their expert, or by

158. Id. at 328.
159. Id. at 329.
160. Sincavage v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see also
Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 42 S.W.3d 386, 393-94 (Ark. 2001)
(finding a judge violated the appearance of impropriety standard by failing to recuse himself where
he had previously recused himself twice in cases brought against Wal-Mart due to family ownership
of $700,000 in Wal-Mart stock).
161. The Commission never explicitly voted 10-0 in favor of a finding of ethical impropriety
based on conduct involving an appearance of impropriety. Such a determination is implicit in the
reports concerning the Commission's action, however. The seven Commission members who voted
against Judge Segars-Andrews expressly found ethical impropriety and thus found her ethically
unfit to continue as a judge. Professor Freeman's dissenting report, in which two additional
Commission members joined, agreed with the majority that Judge Segars-Andrews had mishandled
the recusal motion, but concluded nonetheless that Mr. Simpson's grievance did not provide a basis
for finding Judge Segars-Andrews unfit to continue on the bench.
162. MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 31.

163. Id. at 20 (comments of H. Donald Sellers).
164. Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 116, 691 S.E.2d 453,
457 (2010) (per curiam).
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the Court of Appeals in affirming on appeal, or even by the Commission on
Judicial Conduct, which dismissed Mr. Simpson's grievance without ever
conducting a searching investigation of the underlying facts.
On the other hand, Judge Segars-Andrews did implicitly respond to Mr.
Simpson's appearance of impropriety contentions. She did so in her candid
factual statements when she informed the parties and their counsel about the
conflict problem stemming from the very large fee her husband had recently
collected from Mrs. Simpson's lawyer. By making statements such as, "I'm
going to have to recuse myself,"165 Judge Segars-Andrews in essence testified in
favor of Mr. Simpson's point that a serious appearance of impropriety problem
had presented itself. Indeed, when she appeared before the Commission, Judge
Segars-Andrews explained that she initially had decided to recuse herself
because she believed her service in the case was tainted by an appearance of
impropriety.166 Yet, neither her formal order, nor the South Carolina Court of
Appeals, nor the Commission on Judicial Conduct's grievance dismissal letter
ever mentioned the phrase "appearance of impropriety" in relation to Judge
Segars-Andrews's conduct.
A key lesson to be derived from the Segars-Andrews matter is this-if an
ethics charge is leveled at a judge, it needs to be dealt with directly, completely,
and convincingly. Waffling, flip-flopping, or avoiding the issue is conduct that
only adds fuel to the complainant's position that something is amiss. The
Segars-Andrews experience also teaches that, absent a proper remittal of
disqualification,16 7 a judge should never stay in a case after admitting that
grounds exist for disqualification. Remittal is not an option when a judge faces a
recusal motion. After all, the recusal motion is being made because the moving
party does not trust the judge.
A judge who first concedes that there are grounds for a party's lack of trust
and then reverses course cannot help but confirm the dubious party's suspicion
that the judge cannot be trusted. As Commission Chairman Senator Glenn F.
McConnell stated in his separate comments to the Commission's final report:
[W]e cannot discount what Mr. Simpson reasonably believes, especially
when the circumstantial evidence could readily justify that belief. I also
believe that any reasonable person in the public in similar circumstances
to Mr. Simpson could also believe that justice in this case was not

165. Simpson Appellate Record, supra note 76, at 135.
166, See Transcript of Nov. 4 Public Hearing, Afternoon Session, supra note 114, at 84.
167. If the procedure for remittal under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is used, it
needs to be followed to the letter-the judge must disclose the basis for potential recusal on the
record, and the parties must next be given an opportunity, out of the judge's presence, to consider
the issue. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 3F. Following that consideration, if the parties agree to
allow the judge to continue to sit, the parties' waiver agreement needs to be made a part of the
record. See id The commentary to the Canon goes further, suggesting, "As a practical matter, a
judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign the remittal agreement." Id. at cmt.
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administered fairly. This is the test enunciated in the commentary to
Canon 2A. This appearance of impropriety leads to lack of faith in the
system, and I believe the Commission must endeavor to ensure that the
public believes that justice will be administered in an even manner
without regard to who appears in the court or who represents them.

...

Her ruling in this case, no matter how well-reasoned or correct,

is under the pall of her ambiguous actions regarding her recusal. Mr.
Simpson now reasonably questions both her verdict and his faith in the
administration ofjustice in South Carolina.' 68
The Segars-Andrews matter thus sends an unequivocal message that
"ambiguous actions" are to be avoided when ethics charges are being leveled. It
also makes clear the need for upfront, comprehensive factual disclosure of all
relevant facts by judges on the record, with the parties being given a full
opportunity to evaluate the judge's disclosures before having to waive any
objection through remittal or ask the judge to step aside.
Moreover, if a recusal decision leads to a complaint before the Judicial Merit
Selection Commission against a judge who is undergoing the screening process,
the Segars-Andrews record demonstrates the need for very detailed and careful
preparation. A judge should never assume that because the decision in question
has been reviewed and found unobjectionable by anyone-an ethics expert, a
reviewing court, or even the Commission on Judicial Conduct-a safe harbor
immunizes the decision from scrutiny. As noted above, all members of the
Judicial Merit Selection Commission concluded that there was an appearance of
impropriety problem in Judge Segars-Andrews's handling of Mr. Simpson's
divorce case.
To whom can a judge turn when faced with a troublesome recusal motion?
One option is to seek an opinion from South Carolina's Advisory Committee on
Standards of Judicial Conduct.o70 Also, nothing precludes a judge faced with an
ethical accusation from retaining counsel to provide specialized legal assistance
on the issue. A judge has "inherent power . . . to appoint persons unconnected

168. MERIT SELECTION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 18-19. Chairman McConnell's

observation meshed with the explanation of the Commission majority for its determination that
Judge Segars-Andrews lacked the requisite ethical fitness to continue on the bench: "The
Commission's investigation revealed evidence that Judge Segar[s]-Andrews'[s] conduct caused an
appearance of impropriety that led a litigant not only to question Judge Segars-Andrews'[s] ability
to render a fair and impartial decision, but also to lose faith in the integrity of this state's judicial
system." Id. at 5.
169. See supra note 161.
170. See generally S.C. APP. CT. R. 503 § A ("The purpose of the [Advisory] Committee shall
be to render written advisory opinions to inquiring judges concerning the propriety of contemplated
judicial and nonjudicial conduct.").
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with the court to aid [the] judge[] in the performance of specific judicial duties,
as they may arise in the progress of a cause." 17 1 Such a specialist can be
appointed as a non-testifying consultant to serve as a quasi-law clerk. 17 2 A judge
in need of specialized guidance may also designate a specialist as the court's
expert for the purpose of getting independent advice on a specialized problem,
including a potentially thorny ethics-related problem. 173
If nothing else, resort to and reliance on the advice of a qualified and
independent source should go a long way in helping to establish the judge's good
faith and sincere interest in reaching a principled result free from self-interest.
Above all, the Segars-Andrews matter teaches that it is not enough merely for a
judge to decide a case correctly; the decisionmaking process must be conducted,
as Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct states, "in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 7 4
VII.CONCLUSION

An article about the Judicial Merit Selection Commission's ruling on Judge
Segars-Andrews proposes, by way of a reform measure, that "the Supreme Court
reconsider the prejudice standard for review of disqualification decisions." 75 As
the author explained, a test that requires proof of bias or prejudice is really not an
ideal standard for testing ethical compliance because "prejudice is almost
impossible to prove." 17 6 Demanding that litigants challenging judges' ethics
meet an "almost impossible" standard of proof provides protection for judges
from ethics-based attacks at the cost of fundamental fairness for litigants. The
fact that case law can be read to have imposed an impossibly high proof hurdle
for Mr. Simpson did not go unnoticed by the Commission, which is one reason
the affirmance of Judge Segars-Andrews's recusal ruling by the South Carolina
Court of Appeals carried little weight. In any event, as we have seen, the
prejudice standard in South Carolina for recusal decision appeals is destined to
go the way of the dodo bird because of Caperton.
The proof standard for an ethics violation is lower than that required for a
due process violation. As Justice Kennedy observed in Caperton, "Because the
codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires,
most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the

171. Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
172. Cf Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988) (upholding the appointment
of an economist as a specialized consultant whose function was "in the nature of a law clerk"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
173. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of J.C., 608 A.2d 1312, 1322 (N.J. 1992) (advising that,
where necessary, a judge "should not hesitate to call on independent experts").
174. S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 2A.
175. Nathan M. Crystal, The Segars-Andrews Case-Looking to the Future, S.C. LAW., May
2010, at 8, 8.
176. Id.
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Constitution."1
Further, Caperton instructs that proof of actual bias or
prejudice need not be adduced in order to establish a constitutional violation on
due process grounds.178 In so holding, Caperton performed a great service,
making it easier for litigants and reviewing courts to protect against
contamination of the judicial process. After Caperton, it would be incongruous
for appellate courts to require litigants attacking a judge's failure to recuse on
ethical grounds to provide a greater quantum of proof than what they would need
to establish a due process violation. Hence, the "actual prejudice" standard
featured in the Simpson v. Simpson decision is dead and awaiting burial.179
Thus, Caperton will assist the recusal process by permitting a judge deciding
a recusal motion to do the right thing and step aside on appearance grounds
without conceding that there are grounds for proving actual bias.xso This is
because Caperton instructs that conduct sufficient to cause a judge to "feel a
debt of gratitude" 181 to one side can tip the scale and thereby create an
appearance of impropriety. As one judicial ethics commentator has explained,
"recusal seems appropriate when the attorney now appearing before the judge
helped the judge . . . attain a large monetary recovery." 1 8 2 Was her husband's
receipt of the $300,000 fee from Mrs. Simpson's counsel while the case was
pending sufficient to provoke a feeling of "a debt of gratitude" by Judge SegarsAndrews in favor of Mrs. Simpson's lawyer? Evidently Judge Segars-Andrews
and her husband both thought there was a serious issue-he brought the payment
to her attention, which prompted her initial decision to recuse herself. The
Judicial Merit Selection Commission obviously thought so too.
At the center of the judicial role is the requirement that judges be fair to each
side and partial to neither. Thus, judges called on to decide recusal motions must
above all be sure that they conduct their decisionmaking in accordance with the
command of Canon 2A-namely, "in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."I
This means that judges
and resolve the issue
grounds
for
recusal
need
to
confront
faced with possible

177. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009).
178. See id. at 2263.
179. One way to ensure that the actual bias proof requirement is given a proper burial would
be for the South Carolina Supreme Court to adopt a rule similar to that adopted by the Michigan
Supreme Court post-Caperton. The new Michigan rule provides that disqualification is warranted
where, among other things,
[t]he judge, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, has either (i) a serious
risk of actual bias impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated in Caperton
v[] Massey, or (ii) has failed to adhere to the appearance of impropriety standard set
forth in Canon 2 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct.
MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C)(1)(b) (citation omitted), available at http://coa.courts.mi.gov/rules/
documents/1chapter2civilprocedure.pdf.
180. Likewise, in future appeals focusing on a failure to recuse, reviewing appellate courts
will be freed of the obligation of finding that a lower court judge actually was biased or prejudiced.
181. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
182. Abramson, supra note 148, at 90.
183. S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 2A.
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directly. This also means that judges need to make full and timely disclosure of
all material facts on the record and that parties must be encouraged to review the
facts carefully before advising the court of their respective positions.
Additionally, this means that in reaching its decision, the court must give careful
and objective consideration to each side's position-possibly with the assistance
of an opinion from the Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct or
a court-appointed consultant, should the court have a need for independent
specialized assistance. This means that the deciding judge must steer a steady,
consistent, and measured course to a well-reasoned outcome.
The United States Supreme Court once observed that litigants are "entitled
to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials."184 Just as there
are no perfect trials, there are no perfect judges, either. Being human, all judges
are fallible and they will make mistakes. It is a given that judges will sometimes
produce incorrect outcomes, so a judge who occasionally errs has little to fear
from a fair evaluator. On the other hand, a judge is apt to be much more harshly
criticized where the decisionmaking process bears (or appears to bear) a taint of
impropriety. Simply put, when it comes to evaluation of a judge's ethical
behavior, process can (and often will) matter more than outcome.
The Code of Judicial Conduct defines a good judge as one who avoids the
appearance of partiality. There is no more important time for a judge to present
with clarity the appearance of complete impartiality than when evaluating and
processing a recusal motion targeting his or her ethical behavior. South Carolina
judges who are careful to cloak their well-considered decisionmaking with the
appearance of propriety have nothing to fear from reviewing courts, the
Commission on Judicial Conduct, or the Judicial Merit Selection Commission.

184. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973) (quoting Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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